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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature ofthe Case, Statement of Facts, And Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Dunlap's direct appeals involve challenges to his death sentence and the procedures 
used to impose it, not guilt-phase claims or errors. In 1977, the Idaho legislature made a policy 
decision to broadly define the scope of this Court's independent review of death sentences and 
the procedures used to impose them. See I.C. § 19-2827. 
This decision was based upon the legislature's commitment to ensurmg Idaho was 
implementing a constitutional death penalty scheme. For more than thirty years, this Court has 
honored the legislature's decision and the mandates of the statute. Based upon an opinion in 
which this Court addressed unobjected-to guilt-phase errors in a non-death penalty case, the State 
now asserts this Court has rejected the legislature's policy decision broadly defining the scope of 
independent review of death sentences and procedures. Because the State has failed to show how 
this Court's adherence to the mandates of section 19-2827 has been unwise or proven 
unworkable, the State's claim fails. 
ISSUE 
Whether Mr. Dunlap's Sentencing Proceeding and Death Sentence Are Subject To 
Mandatory Review Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-2827, As Informed by Over Thirty Years 
of Precedent, Or Fundamental Error Review As Defined In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). 
ARGUMENT 
The enactment of Idaho Code section 19-2827 was part of the legislature's attempt to 
meet constitutionally-required standards for the imposition of the death penalty. Section 19-2827 
requires this Court to independently review death sentences and the means by which such 
sentences are imposed, to ensure the death penalty in Idaho is administered and applied in a 
consistent and principled manner, and that it is both humane and sensible to the uniqueness of 
the individual. 
A. This Court's Independent Review Of Death Sentences And Sentencing Proceedings 
Under Section 19-2827 Is Constitutionally Required 
Idaho's mandatory appellate review statute was enacted III response to Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (concluding on facts of cases before it that death 
penalty was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976); Appellant's Reply Br., pp.4-
6. In Gregg, the Court was asked to address the constitutionality of Georgia's recently modified 
death penalty scheme just a few years after the Court declared Georgia's prior scheme 
unconstitutional. 428 U.S. at 179-80. Under the new scheme, Georgia limited the number of 
death eligible offenses, identified clear and objective aggravating circumstances, one of which 
had to be found before a jury could impose death, and required consideration of mitigating 
circumstances in the sentencing decision. Jd. at 196-98. With these changes, the Court concluded 
Georgia's death penalty scheme sufficiently limited the jury's discretion and minimized the risk 
of the arbitrary and capricious imposition of death, rendering it constitutional. Jd. at 196-98. 
In upholding Georgia's scheme, the Court emphasized the importance of the Georgia 
Supreme Court's mandatory review all death sentences to determine: (1) if the sentence was 
imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice; (2) if the evidence supported the jury's 
finding of aggravating circumstances; and (3) if the sentence was disproportionate compared to 
other sentences imposed in similar cases. Jd. at 198 (citing Ga. Stat. § 27-2537(c) (Supp. 1975)). 
The provision for appellate review in the Georgia capital-sentencing system 
serves as a check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. 
In particular, the proportionality review substantially eliminates the possibility 
that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury. If a time 
comes when juries generally do not impose the death sentence in a certain kind of 
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murder case, the appellate review procedures assure that no defendant convicted 
under such circumstances will suffer a sentence of death. 
Jd at 206. The Gregg decision prompted state legislatures, including Idaho's, to adopt similar 
appellate review statutes to bring their respective death penalty schemes into constitutional 
compliance. l See State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 409 (1981) (noting the legislature added 
Section 19-2827 to meet the Supreme Court's objections to Idaho's death penalty statute). 
Specifically, in order to satisfy Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment principles and 
minimize the risk of the arbitrary and capricious imposition of death sentences, the Supreme 
Court has required death penalty schemes to channel and limit a sentencer's discretion through 
clear and objective standards which "make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a 
sentence of death," emphasizing the need for meaningful appellate review. Arave v. Creech, 507 
U.S. 463, 470 (1993) (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 
1 All states that have retained the death penalty have some form of automatic or mandatory 
appellate review of death sentences. Ala. Code § 13A-5-53; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-756, -
703.04(A); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-603(d); Cal. Penal Code §§ 190.4 and 1239; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 
18-1.3-120l; Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209; Fl. R. App. Proc. R. 9.142, Fl. Stat. § 921.141(4) 
and Sinclair v. State, 657 So.2d 1138 (Fla.1995); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-35; Ind. Code. § 35-
50-2-9; Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-4627, - 6619; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.075; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
905.9 and La. S. Ct. Rule 28, Capital Sentence Review, Rule 905.9.1; Md. Code Ann., Crim. 
Law §2-401 and Md. Rule 8-306; Miss. Code Ann. § 99-99-105; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.035; 
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-308 and Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-310; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2521.01, 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2521.03, and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2525; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 177.055; N.H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 630:5; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.05; Okla. 
Stat. tit. 21, § 701.13; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 138.012 and State v. Moore, 324 Or. 396 (Or. 1996); 
42 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 9711; S.c. Code Ann. § 16-3-25; S.D. Codified Laws §23A-27A-9 and S.D. 
Codified Laws § 23A-27 A-12; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 
37.071 (2)(h); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 and State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342 (Utah 2001): Va. 
Code. Ann. § 17.1-313; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 10.95.100, 10.95.130; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-
103. 
When the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 US. 584, 608 n.6 (2002), 29 
of the 38 states with the death penalty already committed sentencing decisions to juries. Thus, 
where mandatory appellate review existed simultaneously with jury sentencing for decades in 
other jurisdictions, it cannot be said the shift in Idaho to jury sentencing has changed this Court's 
mandatory review obligation. 
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(1990) (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion))); Parker v. 
Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1991) (,The Constitution prohibits the arbitrary or irrational 
imposition of the death penalty. We have emphasized repeatedly the crucial role of meaningful 
appellate review in ensuring that the death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily or irrationally."); 
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 749 (1990) ("Furthermore, this Court has repeatedly 
emphasized that meaningful appellate review of death sentences promotes reliability and 
consistency."); accord Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37,45-51 (1984); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 
862, 890 (1983); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282,295-96 (1977). 
Appellate review of death sentences has thus become part of our nation's death penalty 
jurisprudence by constitutional necessity. State legislatures seeking to protect death penalty 
schemes against constitutional challenge enacted appellate review provisions, which offered a 
measure of assurance that even if a wayward sentencer were to improperly impose death upon an 
undeserving defendant, the error would be remedied by an appellate court responsible for 
ensuring death is imposed in a way that is "consistent and principled but also humane and 
sensible to the uniqueness of the individuaL" Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 
(1982). 
B. This Court Has Consistently Applied Section 19-2827 To Independently Review 
Death Sentences And Related Sentencing Proceedings 
Mr. Dunlap's appeals involve challenges to his death sentence and the manner in which it 
was imposed, both of which are within the scope of this Court's appellate review obligation as 
set forth in section 19-2827. This Court first applied section 19-2827 in Osborn, 102 Idaho at 
410, when it was asked to consider the defendant's argument that the district court erred in 
relying on a preliminary hearing transcript in lieu of live witness testimony at his sentencing. 
Where the defendant "did not object to the use of the preliminary hearing record at the time, and 
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III fact acquiesced in its use," this Court considered as a threshold matter whether it could 
address the issue at alL Jd. Concluding it could, this Court held: 
This general rule applicable to appellate review of error is not necessarily 
controlling where we are statutorily required to undertake appellate review 
irrespective of the defendant's contentions, if any. Death is clearly a different kind 
of punishment from any other that may be imposed, and I.C. § 19-2827 mandates 
that we examine not only the sentence but the procedure followed in imposing that 
sentence regardless of whether an appeal is even taken. This indicates to us that we 
may not ignore unchallenged errors. Moreover, the gravity of a sentence of death 
and the infrequency with which it is imposed outweighs any rationale that might 
be proposed to justifY refusal to consider errors not objected to below. 
Id. at 41 0-11 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). A few years later, this Court commented on 
section 19-2827 and similar mandatory review statutes: 
It has also been noted that, where a uniform process of appellate review is built in 
by way of a statutory requirement, there is an increased likelihood of consistent, 
well-guided application of such statutory aggravating circumstances. Such a 
system "can assure consistency, fairness and rationality in the evenhanded 
operation of the state law ... [T]his [type of! system serves to assure that sentences 
of death will not be 'wantonly' or 'freakishly' imposed." Profitt v. Florida, 428 
U.S. 242, 259-260, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2969-2970, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (opinion of 
Powell, 1., in which Stewart and Stevens, JJ., joined). Here our legislature has 
required that every capital sentencing decision be reviewed by this Court and has, 
in! C. § J 9-2827, further enhanced uniform application by requiring comparison 
of capital cases. 
State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 371 (1983) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, this 
Court has always accepted the legislature'S ability to define the scope of this Court's 
independent review of death sentences and sentencing proceedings, and has consistently applied 
section 19-2827 to review capital sentencing errors not raised on appeal or objected to below. 
This Court has consistently applied section 19-2827 to review death sentences and 
unobjected-to capital sentencing errors, while still applying fundamental error review to 
unobjected-to guilt-phase errors. All capital cases where this Court applied section 19-2827 
and/or fundamental error review to address errors that were not objected to below are identified 
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here by the issue addressed, whether it was raised on appeal, and how it was reviewed by this 
Court. For ease of reference, cases are listed in reverse chronological order in table format. 
---"-~-G~i~t J>hase~::~::~~::-~.-t-__ R_~_l_i_se_d_o_n_A .. _lr_:_V. e_i~_l~_; _M __ ~.lIl __ .. n_e_I_'_ ( .. )f_'--I 
State v.Ya~e~l Sentencing: Whether sections 19- Raised on appeal; reviewed 
Idaho 548, and 18-215 of Idaho Code pursuant to section 19-2827 
(2008) precluded admission at sentencing 
of defendant's statements to state 
experts during mental health 
examinations 
State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 63-
64 (2003) 
State v. Hairston, 
133 Idaho 496, 
507 -08 (1999) 
State v. Wood, 132 
Idaho 88, 94-95 
(1998) 
State v. Porter, 
130 Idaho 772, 
785-86 (1997) 
Sentencing: Whether admission of Raised on appeal; basis for review 
inflammatory vIctIm impact not clear 
statements violated defendant's 
constitutional rights 
Guilt-Phase: Whether defendant's Raised on appeal; reviewed for 
due process rights were violated by fundamental error 
magistrate's failure to suspend 
proceedings pending a competency 
inquiry before moving forward with 
the preliminary hearing 
Guilt-Phase: Prosecutorial Raised on appeal; not reviewed 
misconduct m guilt-phase closing because it was not fundamental 
argument error 
Sentencing: Whether sentencing Raised on appeal with supporting 
judge should have recused himself argument but no authority; 
from presiding over defendant's reviewed pursuant to section 19-
case 2827 
Guilt-Phase: Whether the trial court Raised on appeal; reviewed for 
erred in permitting the State to call fundamental error 
the defendant's investigator as a 
witness in its case-in-chief, for the 
purpose of impeaching the 
investigator 
Guilt-phase: Whether prosecutorial Raised on appeal; reviewed for 
misconduct m failing to timely fundamental error 
disclose expert report & improper 
comments during witness 
questioning and closing argument 
entitled the defendant to a new trial 
Guilt-Phase: Whether the district Raised on appeal; no error because 
court erred in failing to sua sponte neither party requested instruction 
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Case 
State v. Fields) 127 
Idaho 901, 910-11 
(1995) 
State v. Wells) 124 
Idaho 836 (1993) 
State v. Rhoades) 
120 Idaho 795 
(1991 ) 
State v. Fain) 119 
Idaho 670, 672-73 
(1991 ) 
State v. Pizzuto, 
119 Idaho 742, 
752-54, 760-64 
(1991) 
State v. Bryan 
Lankford, 113 
Idaho 688, 693-95 
(1987) 
Raised on Appeal; Manner of 
Review Guilt Phase or SellJ~llcing Issue 
.~~.~-~- -r--~-'-'--~----------'~'----~-----l 
instruct the jury on a lesser included 
offense 
Guilt Phase: Whether the definition 
of torture murder under Idaho Code 
section 18-4003, of which the 
defendant was convicted, was 
vague, overbroad and ambiguous as 
applied 
Guilt-phase: Whether the 
eyewitness identifications of the 
defendant were tainted by media 
publication of his photograph 
Sentencing: reVIew of death 
sentence and sentencing procedures 
Sentencing: Whether admission and 
consideration of improper victim 
impact statements created 
unconstitutionally improper risk of 
the death penalty being imposed in 
an arbitrary and capricious manner 
Sentencing: Whether admission and 
consideration of improper victim 
impact statements created 
constitutionally unacceptable risk of 
death penalty being imposed in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner 
Guilt-phase: Whether prosecutor's 
injection of his personal beliefs or 
opinions into guilt-phase closing 
argument constituted fundamental 
error 
Sentencing: Whether admission and 
consideration of Improper victim 
impact statements violated the 
defendant's constitutional rights 
Guilt-phase: Whether defendant 
was denied his constitutional right to 
trial before fair and impartial jury by 
trial court's failure to question jurors 
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Raised on appeal with no argument 
or authority; request for leave to 
address the issue at oral argument. 
Not reviewed due to lack of any 
support, argument or authority 
Raised on appeal; reviewed for 
fundamental error 
Defendant dismissed appeal and 
withdrew post-conviction petition, 
thus raising no issues on appeal. 
Section 19-2827 review 
Unknown; reviewed for harmless 
error but basis for review not stated 
Unknown; reviewed for harmless 
error but basis for review not stated 
Raised on appeal; reviewed for 
fundamental error 
Raised on appeal; reviewed 
pursuant to Section 19-2827 
Raised on appeal; not reviewed 
because it was not fundamental 
error 
Case 
State v. Scroggins, 
110 Idaho 380, 
385-86 (1985) 
State v. Sivak, 105 
Idaho 900, 903 
(1983) 
State v. Creech, 
105 Idaho 362, 
375 (1983) 
State v. Osborn, 
102 Idaho 405, 
410-16 (1981) 
Guilt Phase or Sentencing Issue 
about pretrial publicity 
Raised on Appeal; Manner of 
Review 
Guilt-phase: Whether it violated Raised on appeal; not reviewed 
defendant's due process rights for because it was not fundamental 
trial court to let uniformed sheriffs error 
deputies sit in courtroom with him 
Guilt-phase: Whether Jury Raised on appeal; reviewed for 
instructions as a whole misstated fundamental error 
law and so misled and confused jury 
as to deny defendant a fair trial 
Guilt-Phase: Whether the failure to Defendant moved for new 
instruct Jury about need for trial/acquittal on this ground below; 
corroboration of accomplice reviewed for fundamental error 
testimony entitled defendant to an 
acquittal or new trial 
Sentencing: Whether jury could be Not raised by parties; raised and 
excluded from sentencing without reviewed by Court under 19-2827 
violating Constitution 
Sentencing: Whether resentencing Not raised by parties; raised and 
the defendant to death violated the reviewed by Court under 19-2827 
prohibition against double jeopardy 
Sentencing: Whether resentencing Not raised by parties; raised and 
the defendant to death violated ex reviewed by Court under 19-2827 
post facto application of the law 
Sentencing: Whether sentencing Raised on appeal; reviewed by 
court erred in relying on transcript Court under 19-2827 
of preliminary hearing rather than 
live testimony in open court 
Sentencing: Whether defendant was Raised on appeal; reviewed by 
denied due process by state's failure Court under 19-2827 
to notifY him formally that it was 
seeking death or forewarn him 
which aggravating circumstances it 
would seek to prove at sentencing 
Sentencing: Whether the trial court Unknown if raised on appeal; 
erred III failing to identify the reviewed by Court under 19-2827 
mitigating factors it considered in its 
sentencing decision 
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As these cases demonstrate, this Court has consistently applied section 19-2827 to review death 
sentences and unobjected-to capital sentencing errors. 
By its briefing, the State implies this Court has refused to address capital sentencing 
errors if such errors were not identified, briefed and supported by argument and citation to legal 
authority on appeal. (See Supp. Br. of Resp., pp.l 0-11 ("This Court has also recognized that even 
sentencing claims can be waived if the defendant fails to comply with LA.R.35(a)(6).").) This 
claim fails to recognize and distinguish among the three reviews being conducted at the same 
time by this Court in a unified appeal: direct appeal, post-conviction appeal, and section 19-2827 
independent review. See I.e. § 19-2827(f) ("The sentence review shall be in addition to direct 
appeal, if taken, and the review and appeal shall be consolidated for consideration."); I.e. § 19-
2719(6) ("In the event the defendant desires to appeal from any post-conviction order entered 
pursuant to this section, his appeal must be part of any appeal taken from the conviction or 
sentence. All issues relating to conviction, sentence and post-conviction challenge shall be 
considered in the same appellate proceeding."). While it is true this Court does not review post-
conviction errors that are not identified, briefed and supported by argument and citation to legal 
authority on appeal, it does not treat sentencing errors the same way. The State cites Creech, 132 
Idaho at 1, and Porter, 130 Idaho at 795, for support; however, neither case addresses the scope 
of this Court's independent review in capital cases. 
In Creech, this Court did not decline to address sentencing errors on independent review, 
but instead refused to address Creech's post-conviction claims alleging his trial counsel was 
ineffective because the claims were not preserved or they lacked merit. Creech, 132 Idaho at 19-
21 (rejecting Creech's claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: challenge his prior 
conviction; preserve meritorious appellate issues; withdraw after Creech pled guilty; file a proper 
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motion to withdraw his guilty plea; protect Creech's communications with mental health 
professionals; and spend sufficient time with him). Similarly, in Porter, this Court did not refuse 
to address sentencing errors on independent review; rather, this Court refused to address the 
defendant's guilt-phase claim that the statute defining first-degree murder by torture was 
unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and ambiguous as applied to him.2 Porter, 130 Idaho at 
794-95. 
Thus, this Court has always applied section 19-2827 and has consistently addressed 
unobjected-to capital sentencing errors through its independent review obligation, irrespective of 
whether such errors were identified and supported by argument and legal authority on appeal. 
C. The State's Request For This Court To Apply Fundamental Error Review 
Standards To Capital Sentencings Disregards The Unique Nature Of The Death 
Penalty, The Plain Language Of Section 19-2827 And Principles Of Stare Decisis 
The State's invitation for this Court to review capital sentencing errors for fundamental 
error under the standard announced in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 219 (2010), disregards the 
unique nature of the death penalty, the plain language of section 19-2827, and principles of stare 
decisis, and must be rejected. 
In Perry, this Court clarified the standard appellate courts would apply to reVIew 
unobjected-to guilt-phase trial errors. 150 Idaho at 228. Under the standard announced in Perry, 
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that an alleged error: 
(1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) 
plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was 
a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless. 
2 Notably, Porter did not object to the statute below and did not present argument or authority in 
support of his challenge on appeal; he "simply requested leave to address the issue in oral 
argument." Porter, 130 Idaho at 795. 
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Id at 228. In contrast, when a trial error is objected to below and the defendant establishes the 
error occurred, the burden shifts to the State to prove to the appellate court, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the error did not contribute to the jury's verdict. Id at 222, 227-28. This latter 
standard is often called harmless error review and it is the standard this Court has historically 
applied to capital sentencing errors. Were this Court to apply Perry's fundamental error standard 
to review death sentences and capital sentencing errors, not only would it shift the burden of 
proof from the State to the defendant, it would also prevent this Court from reviewing non-
constitutional error in a capital case, a result that disregards section 19-2827 and is contrary to 
precedent. See, e.g., Payne, 146 Idaho at 571-75 (considering for first time on appeal if I.e. §§ 
19-2522 and 18-215 prevent defendant's statements to state experts during mental health exams 
from being admitted at sentencing). 
The State's request for application of fundamental error review to capital sentencing 
errors, rather than section 19-2827, is a request that death be treated the same as any other 
punishment The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that death is different from 
every other form of punishment, "not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. 
It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation . . . . And it is unique, finally, in its absolute 
renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoted with approval in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957, 995-96 (1991 )). This Court has similarly acknowledged the unique nature of the death 
penalty requires that it be treated differently from any other punishment. "Death is clearly a 
different kind of punishment from any other that may be imposed, and . . . the gravity of a 
sentence of death and the infrequency with which it is imposed outweighs any rationale that 
might be proposed to justify refusal to consider errors not objected to below." State v. Osborn, 
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102 Idaho 405,410-11 (1981). The State disregards this history and asks this Court to do the 
same. Because the constitutional basis for treating death differently from other forms of 
punishment cannot be disregarded without doing violence to the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, this Court must reject the State's request for this Court to treat death sentences the 
same as any other sentence or punishment. 
In addition, the State's request for this Court to apply fundamental error review to capital 
sentencing errors disregards section 19-2827, rendering it superfluous. Section 19-2827, in 
relevant part, provides as follows: 
(a) Whenever the death penalty is imposed, and upon the judgment becoming 
final in the trial court, the sentence shall be reviewed on the record by the 
Supreme Court of Idaho . ... 
(b) The Supreme Court of Idaho shall consider the punishment as well as any 
errors enumerated by way of appeal. 
(c) With regard to the sentence the court shall determine: 
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, 
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and 
(2) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory 
aggravating circumstance from among those enumerated in section 19-2515, 
Idaho Code. 
(e) In addition to its authority regarding correction of errors, the court, with 
regard to review of death sentences, shall be authorized to: 
(1) Affirm the sentence of death; or 
(2) Set the sentence aside and remand the case for resentencing by a jury or, if 
waived, the trial judge. 
(f) The sentence review shall be in addition to direct appeal, if taken, and the 
review and appeal shall be consolidated for consideration. 
I.e. § 19-2827 (emphasis added). By its own terms, the statute automatically preserves 
sentencing errors in capital cases for this Court's independent review without the need for 
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objection. The mandatory nature of this Court's section 19-2827 duty to reVIew capital 
sentencing errors is made clear by the fact that such review must be conducted by this Court, 
irrespective of whether it is even sought by a capital defendant. See State v. Wells, 124 Idaho 836 
(1993) (reviewing death sentence and sentencing even though defendant dismissed his appeal 
and petition for post-conviction relief). Moreover, applying the fundamental error standard to 
review capital sentencings would render section 19-2827 a nullity. Such a result is contrary to 
well-established rules of statutory interpretation. 
It is incumbent upon this Court to interpret a statute in a manner that will not 
nullify it, and it is not to be presumed that the legislature performed an idle act of 
enacting a superfluous statute. Walker v. Nationwide Fin. Corp. of Idaho, 102 
Idaho 266, 629 P .2d 662 (1981). The Supreme Court will not construe a statute in 
a way which makes mere surplusage of provisions included therein. Hartley v. 
Miller-Stephan. I 07 Idaho 688, 692 P.2d 332 (1984). 
Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 572 (1990). Thus, if this Court were to accept the State's 
invitation and apply Perry, it could only do so by nullifying section 19-2827 and more than thirty 
years of precedent. 
Since 1981, when this Court first applied section 19-2827 in Osborn, the statute has been 
amended twice: once in 1994 and again in 2006. When the legislature amends a statute, this 
Court must assume it does so with full knowledge of this Court's existing applications of the 
statute. State v. Parker, 141 Idaho 775, 779 (2005) ("We assume the legislature has full 
knowledge of existing judicial decisions and our caselaw." (Citation omitted)); see also State v. 
Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 529 (2010) ("Statutes are construed under the assumption that the 
legislature was aware of all other statutes and legal preceden[t] at the time the statute was 
passed." (Quoting DrufJel v. State, Dep't of Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 856 (2002))); Smith v. 
Washington County Idaho, 150 Idaho 388, 392 (2010) (recognizing the presumption that when 
the legislature amends a statute, it does so knowing "of the prevailing judicial interpretation of 
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that statute" and such amendments represent the legislature's intent and choice to change that 
interpretation). The legislature's decision to amend section 19-2827 twice since Osborn, but 
leave this Court's duty to review death sentences and capital sentencings unchanged, 
demonstrates the legislature's intent that this Court continue reviewing death sentences and 
capital sentencings as it always has. Moreover, when section 19-2827 was enacted in 1977, this 
Court had been applying the fundamental error standard to review unobjected-to trial errors in 
non-capital cases for six years. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Had the legislature wanted the same 
standard to apply to review of capital cases, section 19-2827 would have been unnecessary. 
Finally, if this Court were to accept the State's invitation to apply fundamental error to 
review death sentences and capital sentencing errors, it would need to disregard more than three 
decades of precedent, in contravention of principles of stare decisis. "Stare decisis requires this 
Court to follow controlling precedent unless it is manifestly wrong, proven to be unjust or 
unwise, or overruling it is necessary in light of obvious principles of law and justice." Sopatyk v. 
Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 809, 819 (2011). Even if section 19-2827 could be disregarded, the 
State has failed to demonstrate how this Court's application of section 19-2827 over the past 
three decades is manifestly wrong, has proven to be unjust or unwise, or that overruling 
precedent is necessary in light of obvious principles of law and justice. As a result, where the 
unobjected-errors before this Court stem from Mr. Dunlap's death sentence and capital 
sentencing, not a guilt-phase trial, the errors must be addressed pursuant to section 19-2827, as 
informed by more than three decades of precedent 
D. Section 19-2827 Preserves All Sentencing Errors For This Court's Mandatory, 
Independent Review 
As previously noted, section 19-2827 automatically preserves capital sentencing errors 
for this Court's independent review without the need for objection. The various provisions of 
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section 19-2827 dictate the scope of this Court's independent duty to review a death sentence on 
the record, to consider the punishment in addition to errors identified on appeal, to determine 
whether the sentence is a product of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary jactor, and to 
determine whether the evidence supports the finding of an aggravating circumstance. I.e. § 19-
2827, 
The State myopically focuses on the portion of section 19-2827 which requires this Court 
to determine whether a death sentence "was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, 
or any other arbitrary factor," providing little more than dictionary definitions of these terms to 
support its claim that fundamental error review applies to unobjected-to capital sentencing errors. 
(Supp. Br. of Resp., pp.l2-13.) The State then cites Georgia and Missouri cases as examples of 
jurisdictions that only review unobjected-to capital sentencing errors for plain error, suggesting 
Idaho do the same. Neither case supports the State's position. 
Georgia'S "plain error" review requires its supreme court to review death sentences and 
errors not objected to below "to determine '[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under 
the influence of passion, prejUdice, or any other arbitrary factor.' OCGA § 17-1 0-35( c)(1 )." 
Collier v. State, 707 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Ga. 2011) (Nahmias, 1., specially concurring) (citations 
omitted). In conducting this review, the Court considers whether there is a reasonable probability 
any unobjected-to errors changed the jury's exercise of discretion in choosing between life and 
death. Gissendaner v. State, 532 S.E.2d 677, 713 (Ga. 2000). In contrast, Idaho's fundamental 
error review places the burden on a defendant to persuade an appellate court that an error 
violated his unwaived constitutional rights, that the error plainly exists on the record and is not 
harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227-28. Thus, Georgia'S "plain error" review is more like this 
Court's review under section 19-2827 than it is like Perry's fundamental error review. The State 
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also relies on State v. Cole, 71 S. W.3d 163, 170 (Mo. 2002), to show the Missouri Supreme 
Court reviews prosecutorial misconduct in capital cases only for manifest injustice under the 
plain error rule. Cole involved the Court's consideration of a claim of prosecutorial misconduct 
during guilt-phase closing argument, not sentencing. Id. Thus, Cole is inapposite. 
Moreover, unlike Idaho, both Georgia and Missouri have narrowly defined the kinds of 
murder that are death-eligible. Compare Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-1 (limiting death eligibility to 
felony-murder and murder committed unlawfully, with malice aforethought) and Mo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 565.020 (limiting death eligibility to first-degree murder defined as knowingly causing the 
death of another person after deliberation) with I.e. § 18-4004 (rendering broad category of all 
first-degree murder death-eligible). Thus, Georgia and Missouri have limited the risk of the 
arbitrary and capricious imposition of death upon an undeserving defendant by narrowly defining 
the types of murder that are death-eligible and requiring an enumerated aggravating circumstance 
be found beyond a reasonable doubt before death can be imposed, in addition to mandatory 
review. Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-30; Mo. Stat. Ann. § 565.032. 
In contrast, Idaho has broadly defined all first-degree murder as death-eligible, including 
murder without provocation and without specific intent. Creech, 507 U.S. at 474. As a result, 
Idaho's death penalty scheme already creates a high risk that death will be arbitrarily and 
capriciously imposed upon one who is not deserving. Id. at 475 ("[A] sizable class of even those 
murderers who kill with some provocation or without specific intent may receive the death 
penalty under Idaho law."); I.C. §§ 18-4003, -4004. Where the finding of an enumerated 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt is the only trial level protection a capital 
defendant in Idaho has against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of a death sentence, this 
Court's independent review takes on special importance in ensuring death is not improperly 
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executed against one who is constitutionally undeserving. Thus, even assuming Georgia and 
Missouri engage in less exacting appellate review of death sentences and proceedings than 
Idaho, both have adopted an additional layer of protection against the arbitrary and capricious 
imposition and execution of the death penalty which is absent from Idaho's scheme. 
The Idaho legislature has chosen to limit such constitutional protections to two 
mechanisms: enumerated aggravating circumstances and broad appellate review under section 
19-2827. Rather than risk a finding of unconstitutionality, the legislature opted to ensure all 
capital sentencing errors, whether objected to or not, would be preserved for this Court's 
meaningful, independent review. Such broad review is necessary to ensure death sentences are 
not arbitrarily and capriciously imposed in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
E. Mandatory, Independent Review Under Section 19-2827 Is Compatible With 
Unified Review In Capital Cases 
The State claims the independent review required under section 19-2827, which has co-
existed in harmony with section 19-2719's special appellate and capital post-conviction 
procedures since 1984, is now suddenly incompatible with it. Specifically, the State appears to 
claim that if this Court reviews death sentences and sentencing errors as required by section 19-
2827, as it has done since 1981, then section 19-2719(6)'s provision requiring capital petitioners 
to appeal any post-conviction order as part of the appeal taken from the conviction or sentence in 
a unified appellate proceeding, is superfluous. (Supp. Br. of Resp., pp.l5-16.) 
The State fails to grasp the difference between sentencing errors this Court must review 
on the record pursuant to section 19-2827, and post-conviction claims which encompass both 
guilt and penalty phase errors rarely obvious from the record. See, e.g., State v. Elison, 135 
Idaho 546, 551-52 (2001) ("This Court typically does not address claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel on direct appeal because the record is often not fully developed on this issue."); I.C. 
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§ 19-490 1 (b) ("This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the 
proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction. Any issue which 
could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in 
post-conviction proceedings .... "). Indeed, the plain language of section 19-2827 specifies "the 
sentence shall be reviewed on the record by the Supreme Court of Idaho." I.e. § 19-2827(a) 
(emphasis added). While post-conviction claims may be premised on errors that seem obvious 
from the record, such as counsel's failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct, it is rare that 
such a claim can be resolved solely on the direct appeal record. Instead, whether counsel had a 
reasonable strategic basis for failing to object to such misconduct would need to be explored in 
post-conviction proceedings where additional fact-finding could explain counsel's motivation for 
failing to object. Perry, 150 Idaho at 229. 
Finally, the State argues section 19-2827 has resulted in federal courts reviewing Idaho 
capital sentencing errors for the first time in federal habeas "without the benefit of this Court 
having a fair opportunity review [sic] those claims." (Supp. Resp. Brief, p.16.) The opposite is 
true. Section 19-2827' s requirement that this Court review all sentencing errors, whether raised 
on appeal or objected to below, provides this Court with absolute authority to independently 
review and consider all capital sentencing errors and issues first, before they reach federal court. 
See Beam v. Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301, 1306-07 (9th Cif. 1993) (addressing challenge to 
constitutionality of aggravator that was briefed before state supreme court but not addressed, 
concluding under section 19-2827 and Osborn, state court's affirmance of death sentence was an 
"implicit rejection of claims of error that fall within its obligatory review even if the defendant 
has not raised those claims with specificity"). Thus, section 19-2827 has not infringed on 
principles of comity and federalism. 
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CONCLUSION 
Death is different from any other penalty. This difference has resulted in the legislature's 
adoption of section 19-2827, which imposes a duty on this Court to review all death sentences 
and proceedings for error, irrespective of whether objections are raised or an appeal is filed. 
Mr. Dunlap's death sentence and sentencing proceeding are governed by the review established 
in section 19-2827, as applied in Osborn and its progeny, and Perry simply does not apply. 
DATED this 1 i h day of August, 2012. 
SHANNON N. ROMERO 
Counsel for Mr. Dunlap 
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